Abstract: The economic and debt crisis threaten many eurozone countries and the very existence of the common currency, the euro. The crisis has meant that some special mechanisms have had to be created (EFSF, ESM) and the introduction of special procedures in heavily indebted countries. The deepening of the crisis and the economic recession in the euro area have resulted in the growth of nationalism and antiEuropean sentiments in EU member states. Resolving the crisis, however, requires further convergence of the eurozone countries, the formation of a fiscal union and a banking union. At the same time, the crisis has shown that the grand theories of European integration, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, have failed to provide answers to the questions raised by the crisis, and this has led to the growing importance of social constructivism.
The impact of the financial and economic crisis on the European Union and the eurozone The financial and economic crisis which has afflicted Europe since 2008 onwards was not simply accompanied by the classical manifestations of crisis, such as a decrease in production levels, falling GDP and rising unemployment, but spilled into a debt crisis for some of the eurozone countries and threatened the existence of the euro as the common currency of the European Union. The countries of the eurozone and the EU institutions frantically sought ways of reversing the risks of the countries affected going bankrupt.
In the case of Greece, the pressure of events led in the first instance to the approval of a 110 billion euro loan to be financed by the eurozone countries, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to varying degrees. When other countries found themselves in danger, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was drawn up and approved. It provides risk countries with loans totalling 400 billion euros, in the form of bonds, which are guaranteed by the individual countries of the eurozone. So that the bonds would be awarded the highest AAA rating by the rating agencies, they were issued only under guarantee of the eurozone countries with the highest ratings, which means that in practice the actual amount available was only 200 billion euros. In this case, the eurozone countries did not deposit cash directly into the fund, but simply guaranteed the total amount of the loan. This type of fund was used by Ireland (85 billion euros) and later Portugal (78 billion euros) and other countries.
Later, the decision was taken to create a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The ESM contains cash amounting to 80 billion euros, supplied by the individual eurozone countries, and the remaining 750 billion euros is provided under warranty. The ESM was created in July 2012 in response to the unfavourable situation and it was decided that it would function as a temporary facility together with the EFSF. This would increase its capacity by 200 billion euros including the EFSF. The purpose of these financial mechanisms was to provide loans to eurozone countries that found themselves in trouble on the international financial market.
The ESM bailouts are conditional on member states outlining programmes for the reforms required or the fiscal consolidation to be implemented in order to restore financial stability. The countries affected will be analysed and evaluated on all relevant financial stability matters by the "Troika": the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. The austerity programmes that cut states budgets have caused the economic situation to worsen and consequently the entire EU has entered recession. Some analysts and economists have criticized the austerity programmes, implemented throughout the eurozone as a priority measure, emphasizing the need for economic incentives that would revive economic growth and provide a way out of the crisis.
The ECB has played an important role due to the fact that it has launched a bond buying programme on the secondary markets, the Security Market Programme (SMP), to be used by countries in trouble. In August 2012, the ECB prepared a new bond buying programme called Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). Through this, the ECB purchases bonds in eurozone countries at their request, but the countries must first apply to the ESM, which has to draw up a recovery programme for the economy based on an analysis of the economy. If the country accepts the terms and conditions of the financial aid, the programme can be implemented. The programme is intended to subdue panic on the international financial markets and, consequently, reduces the interest costs of highly indebted countries and helps to relieve the pressure on the markets of marginal states.
The problems posing a threat to the common currency of the euro have occurred due to the fact that the eurozone contains countries with unequal levels of economic and social development. A common currency requires a harmonised monetary and fiscal policy. The single currency policy is secured by the European Central Bank; however, fiscal policy is implemented by the individual countries independently. The common framework for fiscal policy within the member states is stipulated within the Stability and Growth Pact, which holds that the state budget deficit should not exceed 3 % of GDP and that the public debt of the country should not be greater than 60 % of GDP; nonetheless, the majority of countries have not adhered to these stipulations. There have been no clear sanctions for breaking the pact, and those that did exist were not utilised. In the period of general boom and economic growth, this did not cause any real problems and so breaking the pact was tolerated. The EU institutions have, therefore, prepared a whole series of specific measures designed to tighten financial discipline for all the member states.
The economic crisis, therefore, fully revealed the friction between the single currency policy as implemented by the European Central Bank and the isolated fiscal policies of the individual countries within the eurozone. This contradiction has to be removed and a coordinated and common fiscal policy established in order for the monetary union to function. Some EU analysts and politicians argue that the loans do not solve the problems faced by indebted countries, but simply postpone and exacerbate the problems that in fact require immediate bankruptcy. Others believe that bankruptcy and debt restructuring would have a negative impact on the financial system of the other countries and this would affect the whole eurozone more adversely than providing loans would. The debate has, therefore, been reduced to whether the crisis should be solved by the combined forces of the whole of the EU and the gradual deepening of integration, harmonisation, the creation of economic union, fiscal union and political union or whether each state should focus exclusively on solving its own problems. Harmonising the countries of the EU is, however, hampered by the growth of nationalism and isolationism in various member states. Deepening integration requires changes at the political and economic level, but also requires civic changes-the creation of a European people, a European "demos".
Resolving the crisis in the eurozone. The creation of an economic, fiscal and banking union
The European Union thus once again finds itself at a historical crossroads, looking for ways ahead. In the search for the causes of the debt crisis and the way out of the economic crisis the basic dividing line on the future of the European Union and its prospects for development has appeared once again.
On one hand there is a group of eurosceptics who have argued that by adopting the Lisbon Treaty, the EU went too far in terms of integration. The European Committee directive restricted member state activities, hampering their development and as a result the development of the entire EU and its ability to overcome the current crisis. Therefore, they recommended a reversal, repudiating the Lisbon Treaty, repealing certain directives and returning some authority to the member states. British Prime Minister D. Cameron's statement was of this ilk, when he pointed out that if the UK fails to negotiate appropriate terms with the European Union, then Britain will organize a referendum in 2017 on the future of Britain in the EU (Cameron Promises Referendum by 2017 on UK Leaving the EU 2013).
The second group of scholars and politicians believes that following the adoption of the common currency integration did not continue fast enough and has remained at a half-way point. Therefore, they recommend taking further important steps towards integration, which will not only enable the EU to overcome the current economic and debt crisis, but will help restore its economic dynamism and its status as a major global player.
The situation was very concisely characterized by the Nobel Laureate in economics, J. Stiglitz, in an interview for Der Spiegel: "Europe is facing a critical point. The alternatives are "more Europe" or "no". The halfway configuration is unstable ... Europe needs a common banking system and a common financial framework. If Europe borrows as a whole it could have even better access to credit than the United States" (Interview with the economist Joseph Stiglitz 2012). I am inclined to agree with J. Stiglitz that the eurozone went only half-way and although it may be painful and requires sacrifices, it is necessary to continue down the road of further integration. This was expressed by EC Commissioner Oli Rehn: "Economic and Monetary Union will either be reached through much deeper integration, or we will have to accept the gradual disintegration of the European integration process, which has taken more than half a century" (Rehn 2011) .
Once the EU had managed to save the eurozone and solve the debt crisis of the euro area, the EU authorities focused attention on removing the internal causes which had triggered the eurozone crisis and adopted measures to further develop and continue European integration. After lengthy negotiations between states within the EU Council, "Euro Pact Plus" was adopted (Euro Pact Plus 2011). The main consequence of the meeting was the adoption of policies on establishing a fiscal union and banking union. The pact includes the following proposals:
• The budgetary semester: the EC will discuss the proposed state budgets of member states before they are approved in national parliaments. The EC will issue its opinion, and objections or recommendations in terms of the long-term stability and sustainability on compliance with the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact; • If a country breaches the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, penalties shall be imposed. Any country breaking these rules will contribute 0.2 % of GDP to the ESM, or the EC and if the deficit is not rectified, or if the country does not proceed according to a schedule drawn up by the EC, an amount equalling the budget will remain in the EU budget.
• The revised Stability and Growth Pact, which establishes a system of automatic sanctions, entered into force in December 2011 (Stability and Growth Pact 2013) In March 2012 leaders of 25 European Union countries signed a Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (popularly known as the "fiscal compact") which entered into force on 1 January 2013. The treaty aims to strengthen fiscal discipline in the euro area through a "balanced budget rule" and an automatic correction mechanism" (Fiscal Compact entered into force on 1 January 2013). The pact was not signed by the United Kingdom.
Negotiations continue on other issues as well; however, it is hard to find much member states support for them, for example: harmonization of corporate taxes in the eurozone; linking retirement age to population growth; the abolition of a regulation under which salaries rise in accordance with inflation (wage indexation). In December 2012 the European Council began moving in another direction-the creation of a banking union within the eurozone. The first step involves the ECB preparing and carrying out banking surveillance of eurozone member states. The plan is based on a report entitled "Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union", drawn up by President of the European Council HermanVan Rompuy, together with the President of European Commission, the President of the European Central Bank and the chairman of the euro group. (Herman Van Rompuy: Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union 2012).
The creation of the banking union involves three aspects: a) banking surveillance is the first step towards the creation of the banking union; b) a special fund to rescue banks that find themselves in difficulties in the future; c) the creation of a Europe-wide fund to protect bank deposits.
The banking union legislation should be complete in February 2013. From July 2013 the ECB is to begin surveillance of large, systemically important banks in Europe and of banks in states in difficulty. The surveillance will be gradually extended to all important banks. It was decided that surveillance would apply to banks with assets exceeding 30 billion euros, or to those that have a significant share of the national banking market. This will make for more effective use of the funds available so that they are used in the interests of everyone and are not misused (European Council 13/14. December 2012. Conclusions). The solution involves the coordination of national reform, as set out in article 12 article, clause a): coordination of national reforms: the participating Member States will be invited to ensure, in line with Article 11 of the TSCG, that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed ex ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. Such coordination shall involve the institutions of the EU as required by EU law to this end. The Commission has announced its intention to make a proposal for a framework for ex ante coordination of major economic policy reforms in the context of the European Semester (European council 13/14. December 2012. Conclusions. Art.12, clause a).
Political context of the development in the eurozone and the EU
The paradox of the current times, however, is that the deepening of integration presupposes the transfer of other competences currently held by eurozone member states to a common European authority. However, the economic and debt crisis, and the recession to which the European Union has succumbed, have led to growing distrust in most EU countries about the EU's ability to overcome the crisis. This has resulted in increased levels of euroscepticism and nationalism isolationism, in direct contradiction to the need for integration. In a number of EU countries this has strengthened the positions of nationalist and anti-European parties. A number of these have entered national parliaments, or have even become members of the governing coalitions and have an opportunity to significantly influence the government's decisions (for example, in Greece, the Netherlands, Belgium and Finland). Even some traditional parties are moving towards euroscepticism; for example, the British Conservative Party is increasingly slipping away from the EU and suggestions that some EU powers be returned to member states have been mooted within the party and it has been proposed that a referendum be held in the country on the United Kingdom leaving the EU. In a number of EU countries irredentist tendencies have intensified along with efforts by some areas to gain independence. For example, Scotland has already agreed with the UK government that a referendum will be held on Scottish independence in 2014. In the Spanish autonomous region Catalonia nationalist parties won the regional elections and promised their followers that they would organize a referendum on the independence of Catalonia. The situation is complicated at the heart of the EU as well. In Belgium Flemish representatives have long held desires to separate from less developed Wallonia.
Europe is under the influence of its integration policy reshaping to the new Europe, but ethnicity remains a part of its political and non-political reality. We could say that ethnicity do not interrupt the continuity and remains-real and potential-a political weapon and a natural part of the various ethnical concepts of European society (Gbúrová 2010, 13) .
Evidence of this deteriorating situation is found in the riots in the suburbs of the Paris in France in 2011 but also in the growth of nationalism and xenophobia in the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and other countries. The current global economic crisis has caused an increase in all negative phenomena. Large sections of society, in particular the young, have entered a deadlock and are frustrated. They cannot see any prospects for themselves in society and are therefore searching for the enemy, for the person who caused the situation, and are looking for a simple solution. This is fertile ground for growth in the influence of nationalistic and racist ideas, and neo-fascism movements. Their hatred is traditionally directed against immigrants, against citizens of other races, different religions, and different nationalities. They have now found a new enemy-the cause of all their problems-the European Union.
The austerity measures and public spending cuts demanded by the EU and that are conditional to the granting of EFSF and ESM loans are a way of dealing with the debt crisis in order to save the euro, but in several countries they have caused a slowdown in economic growth, a deepening of recession, growth in unemployment and a deterioration in the social status of workers. This is particularly the case in countries affected by the debt crisis. The most difficult situation is in Greece, where in May 2013 GDP dropped by 20 % and unemployment reached 27 %. Unemployment among young people under 25 was 64% and foreign debt accounted for 180 % of GDP. In Spain unemployment reached 27.2 %, and over 57 % among young people. Therefore, these measures have sparked mass protests, demonstrations, strikes and dissatisfaction among employees in different industries. The mass protests have triggered turbulence on the political scene. They have caused governments to fall and change in Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Italy. In several countries, technocratic governments were sworn in (Greece, Italy and Spain) to bring the country out of crisis. These technocratic governments do not, however, have the support of voters and are generally removed in the consequent elections. Under these circumstances, nationalist and anti-European political forces have been activated, which then took advantage of citizen dissatisfaction trying to win them over and turn their dissatisfaction against the European Union. Therefore, the governments in these countries have been under tremendous pressure and face great responsibilities.
Despite the fact that the economic situation in the European Union is not improving significantly and the continuing economic recession, the representatives of the European Commission stated that the danger of the eurozone splitting had been averted. Well, 2012 was not the year the eurozone broke up. It was a year in which the eurozone proved its political resilience, a year in which we took the necessary bold decisions to ensure the unity and the sustainability of the euro. Today, those still predicting a break-up of the eurozone are sadly behind the curve (Rehn 2013a) .
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that cuts in public expenditures and balanced budgets are not the main goal. The most important goals are structural changes and new investments to increase the competitiveness of the countries' economies, leading to recovery and stable economic growth. The spending cuts must not be used to justify the destruction of the welfare state or destruction of the role of the public sector. "Our joint efforts are all about reforming and improving the European model of social market economy. They are about ensuring our citizens welfare, perspectives for the future, stability and security" (Rehn 2013b) .
In May 2013 the European Commission drafted new recommendations which foresee a reduction in the pace of consolidation in the eurozone and more attention focused on developing initiatives. A number of countries have gained additional time to reduce their deficits below the limit of 3 % of GDP (France, Spain, Poland and Slovenia received a twoyear reprieve; Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal received a one-year reprieve).
If Europe is to remain a global player on the international scene then further development of the European Union through deepening integration is important. If it were to disintegrate, Europe would become a handful of small and medium large states, squabbling among themselves, and it would lose any influence on world events. Europe can only remain a global player as a strong and united European Union. Therefore, in addition to finalizing monetary and economic union, more attention must be paid to common EU foreign and security policy and European security and defence policy. Only a uniform, stable and prosperous Europe can play an important role in overcoming the crisis and creating the appropriate conditions for solving global issues and further developing our planet.
Theoretical approaches to European integration
The economic and debt crisis in the eurozone and the European Union as a whole has at the same time revealed a crisis in the most influential theories of European integration. These are intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism and other theories, in particular, supranationalism, neo-federalism and neo-institutionalism.
Neo-functionalism shifted investigative attention away from national executives and towards the significance of organised groups and their dynamics. It placed its emphasis on the principal agents of change which were identified primarily as technocratic elites, politicians, supranational interest groups and other lobbies. According to neo-functionalists (E. Haas, L. Linberg, S. Hoffman) integration are willing to cede some degree of national sovereignty when and where it is perceived to be in their interests, i. e. where it will help to achieve desired goals. Integration is "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas 1958, 16) . Once some amount of sovereignty has been ceded, a process of "functional spillover" can take over and push the process forward. Spillover is a natural process in which groups see others benefiting from integration in one sector and pursue integration in their own as well to acquire the same benefits, creating a potential snowball effect. There is a shifting of allegiances as more and more often benefits are distributed by the integrated (supranational) actor and individuals and groups begin to see this agency, actor as their benefactor as much or more than the previous state level agency. Functional spillover can only go so far; political will is needed as well, both to initially begin the process and to keep it going. The task of the federal institutions is then to create the political will for further integration. Publics exert pressure in support of and reassure leaders that further integration is the appropriate path. The focus has been on low politics where mutual selfinterest is possible but little real loss of crucial sovereignty can occur. States give up little to benefit economically. Integration to be real requires that states cede power on issues of "high politics" (foreign affairs, security) as well. Neo-functionalism forms the basis for the theory of supranationalism and federalism.
Generally, neo-functionalism is seen as the theory which better explained the 1958-1963 periods, but lost its relevance with the empty chair crisis (Pollack 2005, 16) . This crisis showed that European integration was not a uniform process consisting of increasing levels of cooperation. Moreover, neo-functionalism does not give enough weight to states. Their importance could be particularly seen in the 1970s, as COREPER was extremely important in decision-making. Neo-functionalism is also seen as too elitist and over deterministic (Nugent 2006, 564) . It failed to clarify the integration in high politics, in the area of foreign policy, security and defence policy. Neo-functionalism was the official theory of European integration up until the 1970s.
Neo-functionalism fails to explain the current crisis and the growth of nationalism in member states. Member state institutions and intergovernmental agencies-the European Council and the Council of Ministers and supranational EU institutions have played an important role in coping with the crisis. In the foreground we see integration policy playing a role-political integration, foreign policy and security.
The neo-institutional theory tries to use more subtle reasoning. It focuses on the importance of rules, including informal rules (Pollack 2005, 19) . Neo-institutionalists argue that institutions matter, but that they influence only the incentives and not the preferences and identities themselves. They try to find a balance between national and supranational forces (Rosamond 2007, 122) . Rational choice neo-institutionalist theory says that human beings behave rationally. Institutions do not change preferences, but have an influence on the way in which actors try to achieve their goals. In contrast to other institutionalisms, rational choice theory focuses on formal rules (ibid., 124).
Criticism of neo-functionalism, which entered a crisis, led to the emergence of intergovernmentalism, first in the form of realism (S. Hoffman) and later in the form of liberal intergovernmentalism (A. Moravcsik).
Intergovernmentalism is based on the fundamental premise that since its inception the European Community (EC) has been based on interstate bargains between its leading member states. Heads of government backed by small groups of ministers and advisors initiate and negotiate major initiatives in the Council of Ministers or in the European Council. Each Government views the EC through the lens of its own policy preferences. Integration happens only when, where and to the extent that all member states agree to it. This is because there is no European hegemon that can coerce or force member states to agree to integration against their will. It is necessary to remember that all Treaties require unanimity to be adopted, thus no member state can be required to adopt an increase in the integration status quo against their will.
At the most fundamental level, LI (Liberal Intergovernmentalism) rests on two basic assumptions about politics. The first is that states are actors. The EU, like other international institutions, can be profitably studied by treating states as the critical actors in a context of anarchy. That is, states achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining, rather than through a centralized authority making and enforcing political decisions (Moravcsik, Schimmelfennig 2009, 68) .
The intergovernmental approach includes three central tenets: Member states care and are preoccupied with the protection of national sovereignty; the supranational institutions are considered to be the "instruments" of the member states and as a result they serve only the interests of the member states; the focus is on the "grand bargains" between member states. In other words increases in integration happen through treaty reform (not automatically through functional spillover). "Decisions to cooperate internationally can be explained in a three-stage framework: states first define preferences, then bargain to substantive agreements, and finally create (or adjust) institutions to secure those outcomes in the face of future uncertainty" (ibid., 68-69). Self-interest still remains the motivating factor, but the focus is on completely different actors.
One of the problems of this approach is the assumption that the institutions created by integration process will always loyally serve the interests of those that originally created them. The intergovernmentalists assume no independent identity or interests on the part of the various institutions and ignored activities of the institutions on the level of the European Union. An argument against this theory is confirmed by the fact that even the most powerful states were aiming to assert its interests in the spirit of realism, but only joined the negotiation within the European Council, where each state has the right of veto and were looking for a mutually acceptable compromise.
The way the economic and debt crisis is being dealt with seems to confirm Moravcsik's theory of liberal intergovernmentalism especially in the early stages given the initiative for dealing with the situation was taken by the leaders of Germany and France, Angela Merkel and Nikolas Sarkozy. They met regularly before the Summit of the European Council, agreed on crucial issues and then established and presented their proposals at European Council negotiations. As a result, this increased the importance of the European Council, which, as a summit of member state leaders is the de facto intergovernmental authority. The European Council together with "Ecofin" adopted key decisions which were developed and realized by the European Commission and other EU supranational bodies. The national authorities appear to have stood above the supranational bodies, entrusting them with developing and implementing some of the steps and measures.
It would therefore seem that the current crisis has confirmed the validity of the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, since it can explain the causes of the crisis and help us find a way out of the crisis. However, it in fact only confirms the first part of the theory which holds that the national states play the primary role in finding a way out of the crisis through negotiation. Each state negotiates on the basis of their own interests, but none of them has rigidly enforced their own interest at any price, but sought mutually acceptable compromises.
The EU institutions, however, have played a fundamentally distinct role. They have not simply been a tool for promoting the interests of the member states, as claimed by intergovernmentalists, but have advocated a policy of the common interests of the European Union. This can be seen in the activities of the European Commission, as well as the European Parliament, which in promoting the interests of the EU became involved in conflicts with the member states. EU policy is implemented by the European Central Bank, which took important steps to rescue the euro and to support countries in debt crisis despite encountering the opposition of some member states, who questioned its steps and blamed it for exceeding the scope of the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, it purchased indebted countries' bonds on the international financial markets, reducing the pressure of the financial markets on those states, and it also provided loans to failed states along with the IMF.
In addition, as a result of the agreements, some new facilities and mechanisms were created to serve the interests of the EU-the EFSF and later the permanent ESM. These are tools used to rescue the euro, to help countries that find themselves in trouble during the debt crisis and lose the ability to borrow on the international financial markets. All eurozone members were involved in financing these tools.
Another argument is that eurozone members have adopted a number of measures, for example the creation of a fiscal union, the coordination of budget policies, the creation of a banking union, the first step of which was banking supervision. This means relinquishing some responsibilities to an EU body and is the next step in strengthening elements of the supranationalism in the work of the EU institutions.
On the basis of the above arguments, it can be stated that the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism does not provide us with the answers and cannot be used to analyse the current situation.
Historic agreements are not representative of the entire European integration and decision-making process. Moreover, these agreements are very often the result of an already existing situation and of the pressures exerted by numerous public and private Europewide actors. Intergovernmentalism is part of international relations realist theory and does not seek to acknowledge the importance of non-state actors (Schneider 2007 (Schneider /2008 . Intergovernmentalism focuses on the formal stage and yet informal rules are also very important. It sees international politics as a rational process in which preferences of states and the outcome of bargaining can be calculated. This assumption is wrong because states are not flexible and listen to others' arguments. Intergovernmentalists completely underestimate the importance of supranational institutions (Nugent 2006, 566-567) .
At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s there was a period of conflict between those who favoured supranationalist access (neo-functionalists and federalists) and intergovernmentalist access (institutionalists). None of these opposing concepts-liberal intergovernemntalism, neo-functionalism, federalism or supranationalism-provides a comprehensive answer to the essence of European integration. None of the important concepts relating to European integration which emerged in the past take globalization into sufficient account, and yet it has fundamentally changed the conditions of European integration. Under globalization nation states have lost much of their original sovereignty and they must submit to supranational corporations and global financial capital. Individual states have failed to protect their citizens against transnational capital; on the contrary, they are dependent on lobbyists and their global finance. The starting point for national states is a close unit within the European Union, which can provide a "protective umbrella" against the negative tendencies of globalization. Transferring certain competencies from national states to EU institutions does not therefore weaken or lead to a loss of sovereignty, but on the contrary, is the only way to salvage sovereignty. Therefore, it also stresses the idea that the current economic crisis affecting the EU and eurozone can be solved together by the member states.
Although the member states play an important role in overcoming the crisis, the activities of transnational EU institutions cannot be ignored. At the same time the EU and eurozone also contain within them many supranational elements-such as the common currency, European citizenship, the protection of human and civil rights, a common market enabling the free movement of capital, finances, services and people, the common agricultural policy, competition rules, etc. A number of EU institutions are by their very nature supranationalfor instance, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. EU member states are interdependent economically, financially, culturally and politically to the extent that they form a single unit that can successfully develop only as a joint effort. This means that the characteristic features of supranationalism can be identified clearly.
Social constructivism
In the 1990s, however, constructivism divided the traditional debate between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism and the term "constructivist turn" become accepted and frequently used. Constructivism began to be applied to the field of international relations and European integration. It filled "the middle area" and functioned as a bridge linking the mutually exclusive paradigms of the rationalists and reflectionists (Christiansen et al. 1999, 535-544) . The need to find answers to a number of new issues has resulted in the emergence of constructivism. Some key terms from constructivism are identity, socialization, discussion, interests, and social institutions (Checkel 2006, 4) . Constructivism exists in the form of conventional, interpretative and critical constructivism (Checkel 2006) . The essence of social constructivism is that it explores how human activity creates a social reality which in turn affects social actors. Human actors are not independent from their social environment and its collective system. "The social environment in which we find ourselves, defines who we are, defines (constructs) our identity as members of society." (Risse 2004, 160 -161) . Constructivists ask themselves how common norms affect the interests of the state and its behaviour. This means that the interests of the constructivist point of view are generated by the social actors and are the result of the process of social influence (Rosamond 2004, 173) .
Institutions do not only have a regulatory role in politics but a constitutive one as well; they change not only material incentives, but also the identity and preferences of the players. When the actors act according to certain rules, they do so not because they exist outside the sanctions, but rather because they have "adopted" the responsibilities and obligations that define the identity of the institution.
The constitutive impact of the institutions manifests itself through socialization whereby the players adopt the rules and standards (the transformation of European Community rules to internal rules), and social learning. In the context of social learning actors acquire new interests through negotiation and persuasion, and argumentation. They come into contact with new thoughts and ideas that change the existing rules and, consequently, interests as well. Behaviour changes in a way that cannot be explained by material motives. Social interaction and argumentation is the basis for the formation of interest and identity. Political acts not only constitute the basis for maximising the benefits, but do so according to what is most appropriate in the situation and for the social role. Behaviour is based on the rules and, according to this theory, players will try to "do the right things" and not maximize their profit (Risse 2004) . In this respect, constructivism lies in opposition to the fundamental thrust of rationalist theory, intergovernmentalism and neo-institutionalism.
Constructivism enables us to examine how, in the process of creating social reality, the socialization of social actors changes their values and identity. It enables us to examine changes in the identity of each member state on the basis of the acceptance of EU norms and enables us to examine changes in the identity of EU supranational institutions-the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank. It is able to deal with the gap between national and European institutions, which none of the previous theories were able to do.
By examining the impact of European values we can study issues such as how European integration is changing the social identity and interests of the actors. For the past few years, European integration has changed, and therefore the identity of the actors has changed too and correspondingly their interests and behaviour (Christiansen et al. 1999) .
EU integration is complex and constantly changing. It can be viewed from different angles. Therefore, the idea of building a "grand theory" which explains all the European integration processes within a similar framework, which was the aim of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, is unrealistic (Schneider 2007/8, 5) .
